2. Livelihood Dynamics: by Team, SLSA
1 Introduction 
Rural people in southern Africa make a living in 
diverse ways, often in harsh physical and economic 
environments Such contexts arc fast-changing. 
requiring shifts in livelihood strategies and mixes 
of activities This article explores both the 
vulnerability contexts and livelihood strategies 
found in the three study areas examined dunng the 
SLSA research programme Zambezia province, 
Mozambique, Chiredzi district, Zimbabwe and 
South Afnca's Wild Coast This article assesses how 
such livelihood strategies interact with wider 
institutional and governance contexts, and how 
such arrangements facilitate or constrain 'mess to 
natural resources m d  the realisation of sustainable 
ltvelihoods in these areas An examination of what 
people do to make a living in the case study sites 
demonstrates that natural resources continue to 
play, alongside a portfolio of other actinties, a 
crucial part in rural people's livelihood strategies 
The first section presents some basic information 
on ihe study areas, setting these within national 
contexts. The second section highlights some of the 
changing contexts that influence livelihood 
opportunities in southern Africa. Together these 
have resulted, we suggest, in increasing livelihood 
vulnerability over the last decade in all three study 
areas. The ways such changing contexts have 
affected different livelihood strategies are explored 
in the following section, with agriculture, off-farm 
diversification and migration looked at in 
particular The final section turns to the central 
question of the research: how do institutions and 
policies. or more generically the governance 
context, affect the way people are able to construct 
their livelihoods? This article, then, picks up on the 
themes introduced in article 1, but focuses in on 
the particularities and details of the study areas, 
providing the necessary background on contexts, 
Iivelihood strategies and governance arrangements 
for the discussion and analysis in the subsequent 
articles'of this BulkLin. 
2 The case study areas 
2.1 Mozambique 
Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the 
world I t  has a population of 18 million, a Gross 
National Income (GNI) of USB2 1 per tapitu and a 
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Human Development Index (HDI) of 170th of 173 
countries globally in 2001. This is reflected in a life 
expectancy at birth of 39 years on average and 
literacy rates of 44 per cent (UNDP 2002). The 
country has suffered major disruption due to war 
over the past 30 years, with a war of liberation 
being fought until Independence in 1975, followed 
by a subsequent divisive and bloody civil war until 
1993. The scars of these conflicts are still felt today, 
with people only now returning to places from 
where they were displaced, and divisions between 
the ruling party, FRELIMO and the former rebel 
movement, now opposition party, RENAMO 
(Mozambique National ResistanceResistencia 
Nacional Mocambicana) central to national 
politics At independence, the new government 
inhented a run-down economy with many key 
assets destroyed by fleeing Portuguese colonists 
Large plantation estates were abandoned and not 
functioning and much infrastructure was in a poor 
state The socialist policy of the FRELIMO 
government saw nationalisation as the key to 
regeneration and many formerly privately held 
assets were taken under state ownership The civd 
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war though took its toll and the economy did not 
flourish as hoped for. Only with the end of the war, 
coinciding with the end of the Cold War, and the 
injection of significant amounts of foreign aid (with 
all sorts of associated conditionalities, including 
the steady abandonment of socialist planning 
approaches) did the economy start to grow, with 
annual growth rates of 10 per cent in the late 
199Os, although admittedly from a very low base. 
Natural hazards have had a major impact in 
Mozambique, with the major floods of 2000 (and 
lesser floods of 2001) being particularly damaging 
to the economy and livelihoods. Mozambique 
remains a “highly indebted country”, with 
significant levels of deep poverty. It is part of the 
IMF-World Bank initiative aimed at poverty 
reduction linked with debt relief, and has received 
US$4.3 billion in recent years. The policy 
discourse, at least at rhetorical level, of the “poverty 
reduction strategy paper” process is on everyone’s 
lips, at least in the donor agencies and ministries in 
Maputo, With aid per capita at US$57 in 2000, 
Mozambique is highly reliant on the international 
donor community. 
Research for the SLSA programme was carried out 
in the province of Zambkzia, Mozambique’s most 
populous province. Zambkzia was part of 
RENAMO-held territory for much of the civil war, 
with many local chiefs and other traditional leaders 
prowding support to the rebels. This particular 
political history has had a major impact on the 
institutional and administrative politics of the 
region, with tensions between the central state - 
seen as very much associated with Maputo and the 
south - and the local populace part of an on-going 
dynamic (Norfolk et al. 2001; SLSA Research Paper 
13). 
Zambtzia province has a diverse agroecology, from 
dense forest areas, with valuable timber 
increasingly commercialised by legal and illegal 
loggers; to agncultural lands, some of it of high 
quality where extensive former colonial estates and 
plantations were sited; to coastal areas, with rich 
fishenes (Norfolk et al. 2001). In terms of natural 
resource assets, therefore, the province is 
exceptionally rich. But, its economic status is poor, 
with extensive rural poverty, associated with poor 
infrastructure, weak markets, limited service 
provision and a long history of resource extraction 
- whether by colonists, rebel movements, the 
private sector, party officials or the state - which 
has seen little benefit, beyond poorly paid wage 
labour, for the rural poor (Norfolk et al. 2001). 
Two case study sites were chosen: the first, in the 
district of Mormmbala, is located in the central 
forest belt running across the province from west to 
east and borders Malawi. The research was 
concentrated in the administrative post of Derre 
and focused in particular on the livelihoods of 
forest-dwelling communities. The second study 
site, in the district of Maganja da Costa, is located 
on the coastal strip in the northern part of the 
province in an area where there has been a long 
history of conflict over natural resource use, 
particularly between large landholding private 
sector entities and local communities. Research 
here focused on the administrative post of Bajone. 
2.2 South Africa 
South Africa, by contrast, is a relatively rich 
country, with a strong industrial sector, good 
infrastructure and a sophisticated, “modem” 
economy. With a population of around 43 million, 
South Afnca has a Gross National Income per capita 
of over US$3000 and an HDI rank of 107 out of 
173 globally Some 11 per cent of the population is 
below an income poverty line of $l/day and 36 per 
cent below $2/day (UNDP 2002). Unemployment 
is high at 30 per cent nationally.’ But such averaged 
figures mask the fact that a legacy of apartheid is 
that South Africa has one of the most inequitable 
income distributions in the world. Poverty is 
concentrated in certain areas, and most notably in 
the former homelands. One of the most 
disadvantaged of these, the former Transkei, is 
within the new boundaries of the Eastern Cape 
Province. According to the 1996 census, Eastern 
Cape was South Africa’s poorest province with 70.7 
per cent of its 6.2 million inhabitants living below 
the poverty line.* 
The case study area chosen for this work was 
initially defined as the Wild Coast district of 
Eastem Cape province in the former Transkei. In 
December 2000, the Wild Coast distnct Council 
was abolished and its area of junsdiction divided 
between vanous new District Municipalities. As a 
result, the study district was redefined as the 
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eastern portion of the Wild Coast, particularly the 
new local municipality of Ingquza, which in turn 
forms part of the new O.R. Tambo District 
Municipality. Within Ingquza, the village of 
Mdudwa was selected for intensive study. Since the 
advent of majority rule in 1994, places like 
Mdudwa village have not received substantial 
development benefits. Services remain basic, 
infrastructure is poor and people, in many ways, 
are as vulnerable as they were before, if not more 
so. Livelihoods in the former homelands are 
particularly dependent on links with employment 
elsewhere: in the mines of the Rand, domestic or 
labouring work in towns such as Umtata, or the 
white commercial farms elsewhere in the Eastern 
Cape for example, and so are especially vulnerable 
to shifts in the broader economy. The inhentance of 
the apartheid era, with the homeland areas seen as 
labour reserves for the mainstream (white) 
economy has been hard to break. Local economic 
development has been sporadic, with limited 
success (Binns and Nel 1999), and such areas 
continue to rely on flows of remittances and 
pensions as a main source of local livelihood (May 
2000; Ntshona and Lahiff 2001; Perret 2001). 
2.3 Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe too has a highly unequal distnbution of 
livelihood opportunity, an inheritance of the 
colonial era. The country has a total population of 
12.8 million and an average GNI per capita of 
US$480. But again this masks the fact that most of 
the wealth is concentrated amongst a few. As in 
South Africa, land ownership in particular is highly 
skewed, with the vast mass of the African 
population livlng in the crowded former “reserves” 
or “tnbal trust lands”, renamed “communal areas” 
following independence in 1980. At independence 
the new ZANU(PF) government embarked on an 
ambitious programme of development. Significant 
investments were made in education and health 
sewces, alongside agricultural extension, rural 
infrastructure and so on. Land reform was part of 
the package, with some significant successes. By 
1989 the government had resettled some 52,000 
households and purchased 2.7 million ha (around 
16 per cent, of the largely white-owned commercial 
farmland) However, as discussed in the 
introductory article of this Bulletin, such efforts 
faltered in the latter part of the 1980s and into the 
199Os, and many of the post-independence 
achievements have been reversed, with declining - 
or effectively absent - state support for many 
services, particularly in remote communal areas, 
coinciding with a collapse in economic growth rates 
(estimated at minus 8 per cent per annum in 2001). 
Sangwe communal area in the southeastern 
lowveld regon of Chiredzi District in Masvingo 
prownce, the Zimbabwean case study area, is a 
good example of such a remote and marginalised 
communal area. It covers a total of 48,441 ha 
spread over five wards that are sandwiched 
between the Save river, the Save Valley (wldlife) 
Conservancy, and Gonarezhou National Park. 
Large multinational sugar estates are found nearby. 
The majonty of the pnvate ranches in the vicinity 
had moved into game ranching, in some cases 
amalgamating their land to form massive 
conservancies Since 2000, most of these ranches, 
as well as a portion of Gonarezhou National Park, 
have been settled by beneficiaries of Zimbabwe’s 
controversial fast-track land reform programme - 
many from Sangwe communal area. In the 
language of Zimbabwean landuse planning Sangwe 
is classified as belonging to Natural Region V, 
characterised by low rainfall, high temperatures 
and vulnerability to droughts, and officially only 
considered suitable for extensive cattle or game 
ranching. However, such designations bear little 
relation to local realities. Sangwe is a densely 
populated area despite its low and highly vanable 
rainfall, where a mix of dryland agriculture, some 
small-scale imgation and off-farm activities such as 
building, trading (including cross-border trade to 
South Afnca and Mozambique) and piece-work 
labouring. As in South Afnca, remittance income is 
a significant source of local livelihood and 
connections across the border to South Afnca have 
always been key (Mombeshora et al. 2001; Wolmer 
et al 2003). Unlike South Africa, though, state 
pensions are not a feature of the Zimbabwean 
scene, and rural people must rely more on local 
economic activity as a consequence. 
Table 1 provides a quick comparative summary of 
some of the key features of the three study areas. 
But, as subsequent sections of this article relate, 
such snapshot overviews may mislead. Hidden 
behind such presentations are numerous vanations, 
w t h  different age, gender or socio-economic 
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Table 1: Case study area characteristics 
Derre' and Bajoneb, Wild Coast, Eastern Sangwe, Chiredzi 
Zambezia province, Cape, South Africa District, Zimbabwe 
Mozambique 
Annual rainfall c. 1350 mm c. 1200 mm 450-650 mm 
Population density 31/km2 38/km2 34/km2 
Main crops grown 'Maize, cassava, beans, cotton Maize, pumpkins, beans, Maize, cotton, 
bCassava, nce, coconuts, cannabis groundnuts, sorghum 
cashew nuts 
Diversified Fishing, hunting, gathenng of Pensions, casual Employment in South 
livelihood forest products for sale, employment, remittances, Afnca and sugar estates, 
strategies salt extraction hawking, kin dependency poaching, trading 
Govemancdpolicy New Land Law, conflict 
contexts 
Local government reform, 
land reform, Black Economic emergence of war 
Fast-track land reform, 
between communities and 
pnvate sector, community Empowerment veterans as political 
delimitation actors, economic cnsis 
groups, for instance, pursuing very different 
livelihood strategies. Such patterns also vary over 
time, with new pathways of livelihood change 
emerging in response to changing vulnerability 
contexts. Changes in such contexts over the last 10 
years are the subject of the next section 
early 1990s. This is particularly well illustrated by 
Zimbabwe's expenence of the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) from 1991. In 
urban areas ESAP resulted in the retrenchment of a 
significant number of people who returned to their 
rural homes in search of subsistence secunty The 
removal of food subsidies in urban areas meant a 
3 Changing vulnerability contexts 
The last decade has seen some major changes in the 
contexts within which livelihoods are played out in 
southern Africa. Dunng the early phase of the SLSA 
programme, research teams investigated the 
consequences of these changing contexts on the 
livelihoods of people liwng in the three study areas. 
Three themes recurred in the stories told by local 
informants, and in the rewews of survey data from 
across these areas These were the impacts of 
economic structural adjustment policies; the 
consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic; and the 
ravages of climatic events of different sorts. These 
are now looked at in turn. 
3.1 Economic structural adjustment 
Economic reform programmes have had major 
impacts on livelihoods in southern Afnca since the 
sharp rise in the cost of hmng and falling real 
incomes. It became increasingly difficult for urban 
dwellers to continue to remit part of their incomes 
to relatives m rural areas such as Sangwe. 
ESAP also resulted in the removal of subsidies on 
agricultural inputs and the opening up of 
commodity markets to new players and 
privatisation of parastatal marketing boards. 
Subsidies on key agricultural inputs such as seed, 
fertiliser and chemicals were removed and at the 
same time extension and vetennary services were 
scaled down. Farmers in Sangwe, and elsewhere in 
the country (Chipika et af. 1999), found 
themselves increasingly exposed to the whims of 
the market. For some this prowded opportunities 
as output prices rose. But for others, particularly in 
more remote areas where the subsidies of the 
former state-supported marketing and input 
supply system were targeted, this was a major blow. 
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Most farmers in Sangwe lost out, as they were ill- 
prepared for the steep rise in farm input costs. A 
few farmers, with access to cash from other 
sources, could afford to buy inputs from the open 
market, but the rest resorted to planting without 
applying fertilisers and chemicals, resulting in 
poorer yields and increased food insecurity. 
With markets liberalised, the monopoly that had 
been enjoyed by state marketing agencies was 
eliminated. For example cotton, a key crop in the 
lowveld areas such as Sangwe, was previously sold 
to the Cotton Marketing Board only, but could now 
be sold to a new proliferation of private buyers, 
including multinational companies. Farmers could 
now choose whom to sell their commodities to. But 
this also brought its own problems. Farmers who 
bought inputs on credit from new buyers were not 
able to repay and found themselves heavily 
indebted. However, the few “rich” farmers in 
Sangwe, who had the resources to expand their 
production, took advantage of these new 
marketing opportunities and realised more from 
selling agricultural commodities to competitive 
buyers. Others had to make do with what resources 
they had, often shifting crops to less input- 
demanding options, or reducing agricultural 
activities in favour of off-farm options or labouring 
on richer farmers’ fields. 
Due to a combination of factors, including 
(although this rarely makes the headlines) the 
legacies of ESAP, Zimbabwe is currently in a state of 
economic crisis with hyperinflation and severe 
shortages of foreign currency, fuel and even basic 
commodities. Some attempts have been made to 
reverse elements of the liberalisation policies of the 
last decade. But price control policies, for example, 
have resulted in shortages and the exchange of 
whatever commodities are available in the strong 
parallel market. A second economy is being fuelled 
which is lucrative for the sellers but corroding the 
livelihoods of buyers. Farm inputs, which have 
now also been brought back under government 
price controls, have been in short supply and are 
being bought at exorbitant pnces on the informal 
market. Prices of maize seed, for example, have 
risen by over 200 per cent since 2000 and fertiliser 
is beyond the reach of the majonty.’ The jobs 
market 1s continuing to shrink and fewer than ever 
opportunities exist. The legacy of economic reform 
has been the implosion of the formal economy with 
social inequality continuing to increase, as a small 
cadre of politically well-connected and affluent 
entrepreneurs have benefited from the increasingly 
politicised situation. 
Although their current economic circumstances are 
less dire than Zimbabwe’s, South Afnca and 
Mozambique have also borne the brunt of similar 
market and fiscal reforms. Mozambique embarked 
on a structural adjustment programme in 1987, 
with a major transformation in the economy, 
including liberalisation of markets, removal of 
subsidies and privatisation of state enterprises, of 
which over 1200 have now been transferred to new 
ownership. This has resulted in in-flows of foreign 
investment, particularly from South Africa, and a 
growth in the economy in double digits. But 
economic reform has resulted in substantial 
divestment of state assets with the Mozambican 
elite gaining in particular. As a result, new 
patronage networks have been established between 
the state, the ruling party and a new economic 
elite, and the rural poor remain on the margins 
with few obvious benefits (Bowen 2000). 
In South Africa, the government adopted the 
Growth, Employment And Redistribution (GEAR) 
macro-economic policy in 1996 aiming to cut the 
budget deficit, liberalise trade, and boost foreign 
direct investment and economic growth in high 
potential sectors (see article 6, this Bulletin). Yet 
there is little evidence that GEAR is producing the 
sort of growth that might allow income 
redistribution or of benefits flowing to the rural 
areas of former homelands. Economic liberalisation 
has been held responsible by many for increasing 
unemployment and the knock-on impacts of 
reduced remittances (e.g. Bond 2001). And, 
despite some rhetoric to the contrary, rural 
development and poverty alleviation are low on 
South Africa’s mainstream policy agenda. 
3.2 HIV/AIDS 
Perhaps the most serious factor contributing to the 
increased vulnerability of poor households in 
southern Africa is the HIV/AIDS epidemic that has 
been tearing at the social and economic fabric of 
the region.‘ In 2002, the national rates of infection 
had reached 35 per cent in Zimbabwe (42.7 per 
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cent in Masvingo Province), 13 per cent in 
Mozambique (15.4 per cent in Zambtzia provmce) 
and 11.4 per cent in South Africa (6.6 per cent in 
Eastern Cape).> It has distorted the demography of 
rural populations, leaving in its trail the old and 
young and wiping away the productive age groups. 
In Zimbabwe and Mozambique the average life 
expectancy at birth is now under 40 years. 
Household structures have therefore changed: in 
many instances grandparents are left to look after 
the young and the incidences of female- and child- 
headed households have increased. The death toll 
has also had a dramatic impact on household 
labour availability and remittance income, puts 
heavy demands on women’s time for home-based 
care, as well as causing increased expenditure on 
health care and funerals. HIV/AIDS thus 
substantially reduces households’ resilience to 
other livelihood shocks, such as poverty-related 
malnutrition or disease, drought-induced food 
shortages or the economic consequences of policy 
reform. 
HIV/AIDS has also had an increasingly felt impact 
on the ability of the state or NGOs to respond to 
rural development needs. Infection and mortality 
rates among professional groups in the key ages 
between 25 and 40 have been especially high, with 
teachers, extension workers, government officials, 
NGO workers and others becoming ill and 
subsequently dying in alarmingly large numbers. 
As a result whole swathes of the civil service are 
becoming incapacitated, with staff numbers down, 
illness rates up and, as part of the stringencies of 
economic reform, vacant posts not filled. 
Attendance at funerals of relatives, colleagues or 
friends is sadly a regular occurrence, with major 
impacts on work rates and efficiency. With 
politicians, key administrators and senior party 
officials often struck by HIV/AIDS, either directly 
or indirectly, the wider ramifications of HIV/AIDS 
on the way the future is mewed, policies are 
enacted or areas governed can only be guessed at 
(De Waal2003) 
3.3 Climatic events 
All the study areas are characterised by high levels 
of rainfall variability, with both drought and floods 
being regular phenomena. Such events are not new, 
however. Southern Afncan rainfall has in the past 
been charactensed by cyclical wet and dry penods 
(Tyson 1991; Tyson and Preston-Whpe 20001, 
associated with related shifts in cropping pattern, 
livestock management strategies and patterns of 
accumulation and disposal (Scoones et al. 1996). 
Opportunism has charactensed livelihood 
strategies, with rainfall being a major determinant 
of both opportunity and constraint. However, of 
late, such rainfall variations have become more 
extreme and less predictable. Climate change, 
including major El NiAo events hitting the regon, 
has taken its toll. The major droughts of the early 
1990s and more recently in 2001-2002 have been 
associated with such wider climatic trends. Floods 
have also hit hard, with major flooding in the 
Zimbabwe study area as a result of Cyclone Eline in 
2000. Floods also hit the Mozambican study area 
in 2001. 
Thus climatic uncertainty is a major factor affecting 
livelihood strategies. Yet, coping with such 
variations in crop output, livestock feed or water 
for irrigation, for example, is made more 
challenging by other changes in vulnerability 
contexts. Sickness or lack of labour due to 
HIV/AlDS mortalities, for example, makes certain 
drought coping strategies - such as temporary 
migration with cattle, or foraging for wild foods - 
more difficult. Similarly, the economic 
consequences of adjustment, notably the reduction 
in remittance flows, mean that income sources not 
covariate with climate may not be available. 
As we write, drought - seriously exacerbated by a 
series of economic and political factors - has 
triggered a serious food crisis in Zimbabwe. As of 
December 2002, the Famine Early Warning 
Systems Network (FEWS Net) reported mounting 
food insecurity and threats to livelihoods, and 
classified the Zimbabwean food crisis as an 
emergency. About 6.7 million people (49 per cent 
of the population) were deemed extremely food 
insecure. There have been at least two partial 
failures of agncultural production in the last three 
years. However, FEWS Net also reports that 
‘despite having experienced equally poor harvests 
[to other southern districts], less than 65 per cent 
of the people in Chiredzi, Beitbridge and Chipinge 
require food aid because of their well developed 
strategies for coping with perennially adverse 
conditions and their access to informal food 
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imports from nearby Mozambique and South 
Afnca.I6 The degree to which such strategies will 
actually prove effective remains to be seen The 
2001-02 drought is significantly different to the 
last major drought event in 1991-92. Many of the 
coping strategies available then, including livestock 
sales and finding temporary employment (cf. 
Kinsey et al. 1998; Eldridge 2002). are no longer 
available to many. Instead, illegal gold panning 
along the rivers, harvesting and sale of timber, 
“poaching” of wildlife and “border jumping” have 
become the more desperate measures used by 
people to sumve. 
Zambtzia province in Mozambique has 
comparatively high rainfall on average, and, unlike 
Chiredzi distrtict, has been relatively unscathed by 
the regional droughts of the past decades. 
However, periodic flooding is a major cause of 
livelihood disruption in the lower-lyng and coastal 
areas. This appears to have increased in frequency. 
There was serious flooding in 2001, followng 
major floods elsewhere in southern and central 
parts of the country in 2000 (Chnstie and Hanlon 
2001), where more flooding is reported in 2003. 
The wiping out of any crop production, 
destruction of basic infrastructure (roads, bridges 
etc.) and the cutting off of large areas from markets 
and other services had a major impact on peoplek 
livelihoods in 2001 in ZambCzia. Many livestock 
died and human disease burdens increased in the 
villages For some, assets painstakingly 
accumulated in the short penod from the end of 
the civll war were wiped out at a stroke. While aid 
efforts avoided any major catastrophe, the floods 
just added to the increasing vulnerability of the 
rural population. 
Of the three study areas, the Wild Coast in South 
Afnca is perhaps the least prone to climate-induced 
nsks and uncertainties Rainfall is relatively reliable, 
droughts are rare and flooding not an issue. This 
does not mean, however, that such areas are 
immune from the effects of climate change Across 
southern Africa, rainfall variability appears to be 
increasing, and, although this may mean vanation 
around a higher mean, this does impose greater 
uncertainty on cropping strategies, requinng in turn 
adaptive responses by farmers. I t  is not surprising 
that, in part due to such climatic factors, farmers are 
turning to gardening in the Wild Coast study area 
(as in the others) with additional irrigation, often 
only by hand from rivers or shallow wells, as a way 
of offsetting such additional risks. 
Thus the impacts of economic reform, HIV/AIDS 
and heightened climatic variability are 
superimposed and interlinked and so conspire to 
bnng about a situation of chronic vulnerability in 
these comers of southern Africa, where a large 
proportion of the population live below the 
poverty line. 
4 Livelihood dynamics 
Livelihood strategies in the study areas are 
dynamic, varied and differentiated due to the daily, 
monthly and annual variations in the timing and 
quantity of factors such as rainfall, labour 
availability, input costs, access to public services, 
markets and credit, migration opportunities, 
remittance income and transport costs. Those 
pursuing different livelihood strategies are also 
differentiated by age, gender, wealth and ethnicity, 
as people are able to draw on differing material and 
social assets, political connections, experience and 
expertise. Here we outline the three main 
groupings of livelihood strategies employed by 
rural people in Zambezia, the Wild Coast and 
Chiredzi district. 
4.1 Agriculture 
A great deal of policy on rural development and 
land reform in southem Africa has been informed 
by an ideal-type image of the small farmer. Small- 
scale farming was seen to be efficient and 
productive, providing food security and 
employment in rural areas, and the engine of 
economic growth in the economy more generally 
(see article 1, this Bulletin). This image has a range 
of assumptions bound up in it - for example that 
these are full-time farmers, practising “mixed 
farming” on “viable units” (Scoones and Wolmer 
2002). In Zimbabwe, for example, it has been 
hugely influential in the design of interventions 
from agricultural extension to resettlement 
planning from the colonial era right through to the 
present In Mozambique, some advocate a 
smallholder led agncultural strategy as part of the 
divestment of former state farms (e.g. Strasberg and 
Kloek-Jenson 2002). However, this image runs the 
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risk of excluding many of the non-agricultural 
options and strategies so vital to livelihoods in 
southern Africa (see below) and misrepresenting 
the reality of farming practice for many 
In South Africa, the bucolic image of the small- 
scale rural farmer has perhaps had less purchase. 
The “betterment” schemes of the apartheid era 
attempted to impose a ngid, ordered farming 
landscape in parts of the former homelands, but in 
practice such a vlsion never took off. Labour 
migrancy was always a dominant feature, and 
especially so in the former homelands (cf. Murray 
1981). Farming was therefore part-time, often 
associated with women who remained at the 
homestead and represented a supplement to 
pension incomes for those who had returned home 
on retirement. Nevertheless, with the end of 
apartheid and a commitment to rural development 
through the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme of 1994, there was much talk of a 
revlval of the small-scale farming sector through 
land reform and extension programmes (Lipton et 
al. 1996). However, this never really took off. As 
article 5 in Part Ill of this Bulletin documents, shifts 
in policy emphasis since then have significantly 
down-played the smallholder model and, instead, 
emphasised a category of new, black commercial 
farmer on medium-sized “economically viable” 
plots as the basis for the new agncultural economy. 
Meanwhile, there is remarkably little attention paid 
- through research, extension or policy discussion 
and support - to agriculture as part of livelihoods 
in the former homelands, and this despite the 
importance of a combination of agnculture and 
common property-based natural resources to 
overall livelihoods, particularly for poor and 
marginalised people (Shackleton et al. 2000, Kepe 
2002). 
Notwithstanding the importance of non- 
agricultural strategies, livelihoods derived from 
cropping and livestock management are key in 
Zambkzia, the Wild Coast and Chiredzi district.’ 
Yet the way such agriculturally-based livelihoods 
are combined with other livelihood strategies is 
highly varied, and is differentiated among socio- 
economic groups, Livestock ownership, for 
example, is highly skewed in all areas Across the 
sites, livestock and particularly cattle, is a key 
livelihood asset, and often the route to other forms 
of accumulation. But in Mozambique livestock 
populations have been decimated by war, w t h  
many today only owning smallstock or poultry. In 
Chiredzi district too there have been marked 
decreases in cattle ownership in recent years - only 
a relatively wealthy minonty own cattle and for the 
rest there has also been a shift towards owning 
smallstock, particularly goats. This is attributable 
to a variety of factors including, drought, stock 
theft and discontinuation of vetennary semces. 
Goats have various advantages to vulnerable 
households: they are hardy browsers, they are less 
prone to stock theft, vetennary care IS relatively 
simple, they fetch better pnces than sheep, and are 
in demand for traditional ceremonies (Wolmer et 
al. 2002). 
The shift from cattle to goats has altered the gender 
dynamics of livestock ownership in many areas. In 
Chiredzi distnct, for example, men are increasingly 
goat owners; something that has often been the 
preserve of women. The lower number of cattle 
concentrated in fewer hands has also had 
implications for draught power for cultivation 
More people have had to hire draught power from 
the wealthy few, often ploughing at less 
advantageous times, or resorted to hand hoeing 
fields. It is also increasingly common in Chiredzi 
district for people to plough with mixed spans of 
cows and donkeys rather than oxen (Wolmer et al. 
2002). 
A variety of flexible crop management strategies are 
employed by farmers to hedge against uncertainty 
and cope with the vaganes of climate, disease and 
the economy. These include diversifying the 
vaneties of crops grown, intercropping small grain 
crops to make best use of a short wet season 
(Sangwe); the extensification of fields in response 
to declining soil fertility (Derre); and growng 
vegetables for consumption and sale in home 
gardens (all sites), the major constraint being water 
availability. In the Wild Coast the illicit cultivation 
of daga (cannabis) is also popular and lucrative. 
Another important trend across the region is the 
increase in contract farming or out-grower 
schemes In Zimbabwe, for instance, companies 
such as the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe 
(COTTCO) provide loans for cotton seeds, 
fertihser, pesticides and agncultural equipment to 
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growers, in return for a contractual commitment to 
use them to market the product. AGRIMO in 
Mozambique enter into similar arrangements with 
cotton growers in Derre, although cotton 
production has declined considerably here as it is 
regarded as requiring too much labour and 
producing too little profit. Other ”new” crops, such 
as papnka, are also grown on contract. Such 
arrangements provide a guarantee of income to 
farmers, along with inputs, which they can no 
longer afford. However, they are subject to other 
forms of uncertainty, as contractors may suddenly 
withdraw and the investments in switching to new 
forms of production are not necessanly secure. 
4.2 Diversification 
Alongside agriculture, rural southern Africans, as 
we have already indicated, engage in a wide 
portfolio of livelihood activities of varylng degrees 
of seasonality and remuneration. However, a clear 
contrast can be drawn between the South Africa 
and Zimbabwean case study areas, on the one 
hand, and the Mozambican ones on the other. In 
Mozambique there are markedly fewer cash- 
earning opportunities and consequently a bigger 
reliance on agriculture, alongside hunting, fishing 
and gathering of other natural resources for sale. 
Although here too there is no homogenous pattern 
and rural populations are highly differentiated (cf. 
O’Laughlin 1996; Bowen 2000). Derre Forest 
Reserve, for example, provides a source of 
mushrooms, honey, clay, roots and tubers, 
medicinal plants, building materials, thatching 
grass, firewood and bamboo; and the mangrove 
swamps near Baione are used for salt extraction 
(Norfolk et af. 2001). 
Box 1: Livelihood strategies in Mdudwa, Eastern Cape, South Africa 
Case 1 
Nyuwani is 72 years old and his wife is 56 years old. Both have been educated up to Standard Four and 
both receive old age pensions. They live with five of their children, who are all unemployed, and nine 
grandchildren. As a youth, Nyuwani worked in Natal for six months, herding livestock and doing other 
piece jobs. He later went to work in Gauteng for five years and in Cape Town for three years. Between 
1955 and 1991 he worked for the government as a painter. Nyuwani’s household ploughs one field of 
their own, another that will soon be occupied by their eldest son and a third belonging to Nyuwani’s 
second wife who has long ago relocated to another village. In their fields, they plant maize, pumpkins 
and beans. In their small garden they plant potatoes, tomatoes and carrots. In a good season they fill 
three tanks with maize cobs. When there is a need for cash, they sell one 50 kg bag for R60. With their 
livestock, they plough and harvest these three fields and also help two neighbouring households. A 
women’s vegetable project has been established on one of the three fields belonging to Nyuwani’s 
household, but will soon be moving to another plot. Nyuwani’s wife started the project. She invited 
other people to join her, and charged them a joining fee of R50. 
Case 2 
Nkazi is 58 years old. He never went to school and he is not yet eligible for a pension. He stays alone 
but his mamed daughter lives nearby. He worked before in KwaZulu Natal. He had five joyini (migrant 
contracts) in the area, four joyini to Billieskop, one to a coalmine and finally another one back in 
Billieskop. His wife left him a long time ago. He has not planted anything in the past few years because 
he does not have money. He complains that his single plot is not productive and that he does not have 
money to buy fertiliser. He also complains that his land is small and accuses the village headman of 
allocating people “ezindawem zokukhoboka” (places of slavery, 1.e. unproductive land). His main sources 
of livelihood are handouts from his relatives and weeding other people’s gardens, for which he gets 
between R30 and R100. 
Source: S E A  Research Paper 5.9 
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Box 2: Livelihood strategies in Bajone, Zambezia, Mozambique 
Porteiro is a former Zambezia Company worker; he worked on coconut plantations for almost 30 years, 
until the mid-1980s when the company went bankrupt due to economic and political instability. Like 
most families in Bajone, he lives on a plot belonging to the company with his wife and his six children, 
who were all born while he was working for this company. With the end of the war in 1992, he decided 
to join the informal market selling dry coconut fruit harvested illegally from the Zambezia Company 
land to sell to the small private entrepreneurs from Quelimane City and Nampula province. He involved 
his two eldest sons in the business while his wfe  and other children were engaged in salt production 
and farming in infertile areas belonging to the company. 
In early 1994, when all the people farming in company areas were ordered to abandon the illegally 
occupied plots, he moved to an area out of the company area to get land for farming. To obtain this land 
he counted on the help of his neighbour and former colleague Ndalanda, who introduced Porteiro and 
his wife to his friends, who gave a plot of land after establishing a new relationship. From that period 
his wife lived semi-permanently in the new area, while Porteiro, returned to his original area, was forced 
to change his activlty from coconut harvesting to fishing since the coconut trees were no longer very 
productive. 
From fishing he gained cash income to buy basic food for his household and gave a portion to his wife 
in the other area because in the first months she was not yet producing anything. He also bartered fish 
within the community to obtain maize and bean seeds, and cassava and sweet potato plants for the new 
field. 
Source: Mozambique Team Fieldnotes 2002. 
Particularly in the Wild Coast, and to a lesser 
extent Chiredzi district, waged labour and the 
resulting remittances are very important. But even 
in South Africa regular waged employment is the 
preserve of the lucky few.8 In Mdudwa village 
formal local employment is mainly found in the 
public sector. This includes working in the nature 
reserves, as dip tank attendants, or employment in 
vlllage plantations (for example as secunty guards). 
Informal employment includes seasonal jobs in the 
plantations, caring for other people’s children, and 
collecting fuelwood for other people. Box 1 offers 
profiles of two contrasting livelihood strategies 
from people resident in Mdudwa village in the 
Eastern Cape of South Africa. 
In Sangwe communal area, Zimbabwe, there are 
limited employment opportunities in Chiredzi 
township and on the large sugar estates. However, 
the recent economic collapse has camed off many 
Jobs in its wake, forcing people to look further 
afield for work (see below). But the new political 
(and physical) landscape has brought new 
opportunities for some. The fast-track land reform 
has created a large demand for short-term 
agricultural labour to clear fields from former cattle 
and game ranches, as wealthier settlers have 
employed a new class of informal “farm workers” 
(SLSA Research Paper 3) .  
Unlike other countries in the region, pensions in 
South Africa make a significant contribution to 
rural livelihoods (see Box 11, constituting the bulk 
of the government’s welfare budget. Pensions are 
the only regular source of cash income for many of 
the poorest households and typically support large 
extended families. In the Eastern Cape, pensions 
constitute approximately 40 per cent of household 
income, substantially higher than other provinces 
(Statistics South Africa 1999). Pension transfers are 
therefore perhaps the state’s most important 
contribution to rural livelihoods. 
In Mozambique relyng on a pension is not an 
option and, as elsewhere, the range of diversified 
livelihood activities includes a number of local 
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crafts and trades, such as basket and mat making, 
beer brewing, building, carpentry, pottery and 
blacksmithing. Local trade is also very important 
and this typically, as in Derre, assumes an 
international dimension. Malawi, which borders 
Monumbala district, is more accessible than the 
distnct capital and cross-border trade is largely 
unrestncted. Malawi also provides a source of 
commodities harder to source in Mozambique 
Bicycles, for example, are particularly sought after, 
given the lack of transport infrastructure, and are 
commonly traded for maize and beans (Norfolk et 
al. 2001). 
Even times of flux and crisis provide openings for 
opportunists. A number of new entrepreneurs have 
sprung up in occupied commercial farms and the 
fast-track resettlement areas neighbouring 
Zimbabwe’s Sangwe communal area in recent 
years. These are people with access to limited 
capital and with political connections and lacking 
scruples who are able to take advantage of the 
situation by opening shabeens or setting up 
secunty companies in the resettlement areas for 
example (SLSA Research Paper 3 ) .  A “new” 
livelihood strategy open to those wthout capital 
has been poaching game to sell meat locally. In the 
climate of relative law enforcement laxity there 
have also been opportunities for theft and sale of 
other resources belonging to commercial farmers 
including: cattle (which are sold locally for meat or 
dnven to Mozambique), sugar cane, fencing wre,  
and firewood. Activities such as prostitution, gold 
panning, and smuggling to and from Mozambique 
and South Afnca are also on the increase in 
Zimbabwe. The aftermath of the Mozambican war 
provided similar room for illicit livelihood 
strategies, as Box 2 demonstrates. 
4.3 Migration 
Rural southern Africans have long had lifestyles 
charactensed by a high degree of mobility. Whether 
it is an opportunistic response to famine and nsk. 
as hunters or traders, or as refugees, movlng in 
search of a better livelihood, geographical movement 
is embedded within a range of cultural strategies 
Migration is thus not a recent phenomenon and 
there was a tradition of migration ingrained in the 
pattern of everyday life. Labour migration from the 
Sangwe region of Zimbabwe to South Afnca dates 
from the opening of the diamond and gold fields in 
the nineteenth century. With large-scale labour 
migration to the mines repatriated wages became 
an important pillar of the local economy and 
migrant labour came to be viewed increasingly as a 
stage in a boy’s passage to manhood Today this is 
still the case, although there have been significant 
changes in the migrant labour experience. In the 
past, notwithstanding the activities of 
unscrupulous labour recruiters, there was a 
legitimate, licensed and organised recruitment 
process. In recent times the vast majonty of labour 
migrants have been criminalised as crack-downs 
on immigration in South Africa have led them to 
become “border jumpers” running the risk of 
dangerous animals and arrest as they travel at night 
through Kruger National Park Most work is poorly 
paid and illegal on farms or in the cities rather than 
in the mines Internews suggested that there has 
been a diminishing terms of trade from the point of 
view of the labour migrants. While previous 
generations would have remitted a relatively large 
amount and returned with money to buy livestock 
and build houses current returnees rarely bnng 
more than a few consumer durables (such as radios 
and bicycles) and enough money to buy smallstock 
(Wolmer et al 2002). But economic meltdown, 
lack of job prospects at home and the current food 
cnsis are increasing the flow of illicit work-seekers 
over the border 
In Derre, Mozambique, the most common form of 
migration is of young men to the local cities of 
Mocuba, Quelimane, Beira and Nampula In 
Bajone, most of the reported migration was longer 
distance to Beira, Maputo and South Afnca A large 
proportion of the residents of both Derre and 
Bajone areas were displaced during the years of 
civd war (locally, or to Malawi) and are relatively 
recent returnees. Households with members living 
in urban areas also have better access to 
manufactured products which they are able to 
trade for labour using the ganho-ganho system (see 
below) and hence cultivate larger areas (Norfolk rt 
al. 2001) 
The remittances returned to families by labour 
migrants are also a crucial component of 
livelihoods in South Afnca. However, remittances 
to rural areas have declined in recent years. This is 
due, in large part, to retrenchments in the mining, 
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manufacturing and public sectors, but also due to 
permanent migration of workers and their families 
to urban areas followng the scrapping of influx 
controls in the late 1980s. The 1997 Rural Survey 
found that the average contnbution of remittances 
to household income was 21.3 per cent nationally 
and 23.4 per cent in the Eastern Cape (Statistics 
South Africa 1999). Communities in Mdudwa and 
elsewhere have been hard hit by the retrenchments 
taking place across key sectors of the economy 
(Ntshona and Lahiff 2001). 
4.4 Changing governance contexts 
Gaining access to the resources required for 
different livelihood strateges, whether based on 
agnculture, off-farm diversification or migration, or 
combinations of these, requires negotiating an 
often complex and confusing institutional maze 
(see article 1, this Bulletin). Access to land, labour, 
cash or social networks is mediated by institutions 
of vanous sorts. These range from very local, often 
informal, arrangements between kin or village 
members to more formalised institutions at wllage, 
district, provincial or national level. The changes 
we have described above have affected these 
institutional arrangements - and the power and 
authonty relationships that underly them - in 
fundamental ways over the past decade or so. Just 
as vulnerability contexts and livelihood strategies 
are undergoing change, so are institutional 
arrangements and the wider governance contexts 
of which they are part. 
For example, at the local level the institutional 
arrangements underpinning agncultural practice 
are in flux. particularly as HIVIAIDS, poverty and 
drought have caused labour and draught power 
shortages for many. In Derre and Bajone in 
Mozambique an informal labour provision 
arrangement known as ganho-ganho is still strong. 
This is a system of prowding labour in the fields of 
other families in return for payment, usually with 
manufactured items rather than cash or local 
produce. It is an important source of support for 
the most vulnerable households, particularly 
widows, yet men, who tend to be more mobile, 
have more opportunities to earn ganho-ganho. Beer 
parties, where food and dnnk are prepared for 
fnends, relatives and neighbours in return for 
farming assistance. particularly cultivation, are also 
common (Norfolk et al. 2001). In Sangwe, 
Zimbabwe, a similar labour and draught power 
sharing arrangement known as dhava has become 
increasingly commercialised in recent years and 
withdrawn into tighter kin or patron-client 
networks (Wolmer et al. 2002). 
As articles in subsequent parts of this Bulletin 
document in much more detail, there has been an 
ongoing multiplication of institutions of varytng 
degrees of legitimacy and popular support in the 
rural areas of southern Africa. Thus chiefs, local 
councils, district administrators, sectoral 
ministries, catchment councils, user committees, 
traditional healers, community courts, peasant 
associations, war veterans, churches, NGOs, 
political parties, and pnvate companies, among 
many others, all compete for power and resources. 
The shifting conflicts over power and revenue 
between these and other institutions are 
undoubtedly altering the ways rural people gain 
access to assets and semces. 
In all three countnes, policy initiatives from central 
government, often heavily sponsored by donor 
agencies, have been attempting to develop forms of 
local administration to deliver rural development 
The creation of district, municipal or prowncial 
local governments has been attempted w t h  varylng 
degrees of success (see article 7, this Bulletin). As 
part of the new, post independence/apartheid 
democratic settlement such authorities are invested 
w t h  much hope, if not much power or resources. 
Yet they compete with other longer-standing 
sources of authority, most particularly so-called 
“traditional” leaders. Very often creations of 
previous regimes, chiefs, headmen and others 
claim authonty over rural affairs, and carry w t h  
them certain allegiances. There are often tensions 
between such leaders and the contemporary state. 
For instance, in Mozambique many chiefs in the 
Zambkzia province were RENAMO supporters in 
the civil war and remain suspicious of the 
FRELIMO government (SLSA Research Paper 13; 
Wilson 1992). Similarly, in South Afnca, chiefs in 
the former homelands often benefited from the 
homeland system and are still seen by some in the 
ANC as a block to transformation (Nstebeza 1999). 
In Zimbabwe, chiefs may have ethnic allegances 
and may resent the imposition of party-based rule 
from outside, while others may be supporters of 
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Box 3: War veterans, the state, chiefs, ancestral spirits and land allocation in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform process involmng the seizure and resettlement of largely white- 
owned commercial farmland has dramatically altered the physical landscape in Zimbabwe. Alongside 
this, a new political terrain has rapidly unravelled with new actors and new institutions. This is a 
confusing and dynamic landscape populated by actors as diverse as entrepreneurial war veteran 
“security guards”-cum-protection racketeers, militant ZANU(PF) youth brigades, and marauding 
elephants possessed by chiefly spirits. 
A rejuvenated movement of veterans from the guerrilla struggle for independence in the 1970s has 
emerged as key political players on the new resettlement schemes. They led a quasi-militarised 
occupation of the farms and as base commanders chainng new settlers’ committees and reporting 
directly to district and national levels they constituted a new, parallel, and highly politicised, loop of 
governance which by-passed existing state structures. The war veterans have both made concessions to, 
and been able to exert a certain degree of power over, representatives of the state (such as the 
agricultural extensionists planning the new resettlement areas) and traditional authorities, in particular 
the chiefs. It is the war veterans, not chiefs who have decided where and when land is occupied and to 
whom it is allocated, but chiefly ratification, even post hoc, is important for the perceived legitimacy of 
the process. However, chiefs suspected of supporting the opposition party have been marginalised 
entirely. In Chiredzi district this is all layered over the politics of ethnicity, with ethnic and familial 
connections with local ancestral spirits being another source of legitimacy in land claims and of local 
political authority in the new resettlement areas. 
Tensions between authoritarian nationalism and ethnic politics, between a militarised, modernist order 
and “traditional” religion and authonty have created a complex political mosaic, made up of multiple 
and overlapping identities and positions. 
Source: SLSA Research Paper 3. 
the opposition and may not be in favour with party 
officials locally (SEA Research Paper 3).  
Such tensions are played out in the vanety of 
attempts to decentralise the management of natural 
resources. Newly empowered local authonties, 
municipalities and resource management groups 
(such as catchment councils, wldlife committees, 
borehole committees or forest management 
groups) are being superimposed upon “traditional” 
authority structures. Such dynamics are further 
complicated by the encouragement of the private 
sector to become engaged in rural areas, through 
mining, forestry, agriculture, wildlife or tourism 
ventures, for example (see article 6, this Bulletin). 
With unclear lines of authority and variable 
legitimacy of local leaders, rural communities are 
often not well placed to negotiate good deals with 
pnvate sector entrants who often have more 
resources to hand than scruples. In settings of 
extreme livelihood vulnerability and extensive 
poverty, the promise of some limited benefits of a 
concession arrangement or a joint venture deal 
may look highly appealing. Those able to grab the 
opportunity, i.e. usually the relatively rich and 
powerful at the local level, do so, often to the 
longer term detriment of the area, and a further 
margnalisation of the already poor. 
The complexities of this fluid situation, with new 
players entering into subtle, power-laden 
negotiations and allegiances, is particularly well 
illustrated by the trade-offs between war veterans, 
chiefs, extension services and ancestral spirits in 
the process of land allocation in Zimbabwe (BOX 3 ) .  
In contexts where the only permanent thing seems 
to be constant change. rural people and policy- 
makers alike are grappling to come to terms with 
the complex nature of these fast-changing 
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governance processes. Drawing on the detailed 
empirical material gathered in the three study 
areas, the articles in the rest of this Bulletin ask how 
the changing institutional and policy environment 
in southern Africa is affecting people’s access to 
natural resources and hence their ability to pursue 
sustainable livelihoods In Part 11, the articles look 
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